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Safeguarding the Commander’s Authority to Review 
the Findings of a Court-Martial 
Andrew S. Williams* 
“Do you really think that after a jury has found someone guilty, 
and dismissed someone from the military for sexual assault, that one 
person [the commander], against the advice of their legal counselor, 
should be able to say, ‘Never mind’?” Senator Claire McCaskill re-
cently posed this question in a hearing before the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee,1 as she and others expressed outrage over the dismis-
sal of a sexual assault conviction by a military commander. Her 
question reflects a justifiably profound respect for the verdicts of juries, 
one that runs deep in American legal tradition, but reveals a basic mis-
understanding about the court-martial panel in the military. 
The court-martial panel is not a true jury. Federal juries in crimi-
nal cases must have twelve jurors and be unanimous.2 State juries must 
have at least six jurors, and five of six jurors voting to convict is not 
enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.3 Unlike federal and state ju-
ries, the panel that convicted the accused in the sex assault case dis-
cussed above had only five members and it did not have to be unani-
mous—only a two-thirds vote, or four out of five, was needed for a 
conviction. No five-member panel, unanimous or not, is a jury. Be-
cause the panel was not a true jury, the panel’s verdict will not always 
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(Air Forces Strategic), Air Force Space Command, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The 
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thanks Melissa Barsotti, Joseph “Dutch” Bialke, Alan Coe, Robert Coit, Ryan Hoback, and Mark 
Patterson. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not The Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps, the United States Air Force, or the Department of Defense. 
 1.  Donna Casseta, Senators Outraged By Dismissal of Assault Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Mar. 5, 2003, 5:20 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/senators-outraged-dismissal-assault-case-
213240150.html (emphasis added). 
 2.  See infra pt. III.E, F. 
 3.   Id. 
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resemble the commonsense judgment of a jury. The Supreme Court 
made clear that court-martial panels are not juries: 
We find nothing in history or constitutional treatment of military 
tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article III courts as 
adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people charged with offenses 
for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty or property.4 
If the sexual assault case mentioned above had been tried by the 
same panel in federal or state court, the Supreme Court would have 
swiftly thrown out the conviction, for any one of these three reasons: 
(1) the panel did not have to be unanimous, (2) it was not selected from 
a cross-section of the community, and (3) it was too small to have ef-
fective deliberations, thereby raising “substantial doubt about the reli-
ability and appropriate representation of panels smaller than six.”5 Be-
cause court-martial panels are not juries, neither the public nor the 
military community can be genuinely confident that court-martial 
panels will always reach appropriate verdicts. 
As the Supreme Court stated, “There are dangers lurking in mili-
tary trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and 
Article III of our Constitution.”6 The Founding Fathers understood 
these dangers when they permitted the use of courts-martial in the 
U.S. Armed Forces. Consequently, they gave commanders the extraor-
dinary authority to review the findings of a court-martial in order to 
correct the occasional, but inevitable, miscarriage of justice. This au-
thority is now being criticized. 
Some critics believe that commanders should be denied this au-
thority because they lack legal training.7 They also point out that, even 
if the commander’s authority is eliminated, the military accused will 
still be protected by a robust system of appeal rights.8 However, these 
arguments are entirely incorrect. A commander does not need legal 
 
 4.  United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
 5.  Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (conviction was set aside because five-
member jury was too small); see also Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (conviction was set 
aside because six-member jury was not unanimous). 
 6.  Toth, 350 U.S. at 22 (holding that a court-martial had no jurisdiction over a discharged 
military member suspected of committing a murder while on active duty). 
 7.  See Editorial Board, Next Steps on Military Sexual Assaults, (Apr. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/opinion/next-steps-on-military-sexual-assaults.html?p. 
 8.  Id. 
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training to properly review the findings of a court-martial. Addition-
ally, the rights of appeal are illusory with respect to the type of review 
needed to protect against the potential for a panel’s erroneous factual 
findings. 
In a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
acting Department of Defense General Counsel Robert S. Taylor 
seemed to echo critics while also unwittingly making a salient point: 
“There is something that seems odd about the power to reject the find-
ings that came out of a jury in the absence of some major obvious prob-
lem.”9 That is precisely the danger with the panel’s findings. The in-
correctness of the verdict will not always be apparent and may not be 
discoverable at all. Because the panel’s factual determinations will not 
always be as accurate as those of a jury, commanders need the authority 
to review those determinations. 
In a recent editorial, Senator McCaskill wrote, 
And while the military justice system is different from our civil justice 
system for good reasons, I believe the time has come to take a hard look 
at the rules which allow military commanders to vacate entire jury 
convictions, expunge criminal records, and reinstate convicted sex of-
fenders to the ranks of our armed forces, without even offering justi-
fication.10 
There are many good reasons why the military justice system is 
different than the civilian system. Much deserves to be said about why 
commanders must retain oversight and control over the court-martial 
process. The purpose of this paper is more limited in scope. It is to 
demonstrate that a court-martial panel is not a true jury and that the 
commander should retain the authority to review its findings for this 
reason alone. Although commanders need certain authorities to exe-
cute their duties, a full explanation of these reasons is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
 
 9.  Molly O’Toole, Senators Push Sex Assault Controversy at Hearing, Grilling Military 
Leaders, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2013, 6:21 PM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2013/03/13/senators-sex-assualt-hearing_n_2869473.html. 
 10.  Claire McCaskill, Their Day in Court, ST. LOUIS TODAY (Mar. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/their-day-in-court/article_ced54e14-5dca-
5c53-a038-4b9de9ccbaa9.html (emphasis added). 
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Part I introduces the right to trial by jury as the key to liberty in 
the American scheme of justice. It also explains why the Founding Fa-
thers denied military members this right along with all other protec-
tions of the Bill of Rights. Part II discusses the historical foundations 
of the court-martial and why the military justice system developed sep-
arately from the civilian justice system. The court-martial was and still 
is, first and foremost, a tool of discipline and not a court of law. Part 
III describes the essential differences between panels and juries and 
why those differences materially affect the reliability of verdicts. Part 
IV discusses the safeguards enacted by Congress to make up for the 
panel’s structural flaws. These safeguards are as unorthodox to the 
American scheme of justice as they are now controversial. They should 
not be eliminated unless the panel’s structural flaws are also corrected. 
Part V contains recommendations for amending the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, to include a return to the original understanding that 
courts-martial should be limited in times of peace to disciplinary in-
fractions. If the commander’s role seems antiquated today, so, too, is 
the denial of genuine due process to the men and women who serve in 
the U.S. Armed Forces. 
PART I: THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY AND THE COURT-
MARTIAL 
For over six hundred years, unanimity of twelve jurors was the es-
sential feature of jury trials at common law.11 The great jurist Sir Wil-
liam Blackstone praised the right to a trial by jury as “‘the grand bul-
wark’ of English liberties”12 and “the glory of the English law.” 13 In 
describing jury trials as “the most transcendent privilege which any 
subject can enjoy or wish for,” Blackstone observed that no one could 
 
 11.  JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 179 (Harvard U. Press 2000) (“The first recorded instance of a unanimous verdict 
occurred in 1367, when an English Court refused to accept an 11-1 guilty vote after the lone 
holdout stated he would rather die in prison than consent to convict.”). 
 12.  Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999) (quoting Blackstone). 
 13.  Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 142–43 (1951) (quoting 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 227–29 (Oxford, Clarendon Pr. 
1992) (1765)). 
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be affected, “either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by 
the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and equals.”14 
The Founding Fathers also prized the right to a jury trial, which 
they considered as their birthright and inheritance from the common 
law.15 In 1765, the Stamp Act Congress in its Declaration of Rights 
asserted, “That trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of 
every British subject in these colonies.”16 In the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the Founding Fathers censured King George III, “For de-
priving us in many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury.”17 After win-
ning their independence, they took care to insert into the Constitution 
the guarantee that, “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury.”18 
John Adams, who defended the British soldiers accused of carrying 
out what had become known as the Boston Massacre, called jury trial, 
“the lungs of liberty.”19 Thomas Jefferson identified it as “the only an-
chor ever yet invented by man, by which a government can be held to 
the principles of its constitution.”20 James Wilson, one of six men to 
sign both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution,21 
stated, “To the conviction of a crime, the undoubting and the unani-
mous sentiment of the twelve jurors is of indispensable necessity.”22 In 
the debate over the Constitution before its ratification, Alexander 
Hamilton observed in his Federalist Papers: 
The friends and adversaries of the plan and convention, if they agree 
in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by 
 
 14.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 15. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION :§§ 1773–75 (1983), re-
printed in 4 PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDING FATHERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 407. 
 16.  Stamp Act Congress, Declaration of Rights, 7th. (19 Oct. 1765) (Sources 270), reprinted 
in PHILIP B. KURLAND AND RALPH LERNER, 5 THE FOUNDING FATHERS’ CONSTITUTION 
251 (Univ. Chicago Press 1987). 
 17.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
 18.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 19. Thomas J. Methvin, Alabama—The Arbitration State, 62 ALA. LAW. 48, 49 (2001). 
 20.  Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Thomas Paine, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 71 (Washington, ed., 1861) (1788). 
 21.  Richard O. Lempert, Uncovering ‘Nondiscernible’ Differences: Empirical Research and the 
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 660 n.55 (1975). 
 22.  2 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 503, 528 (Richard McCloskey 
ed., 1967), quoted in Lempert, supra note 21 (emphasis added). 
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jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the 
former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent 
it as the very palladium of free government.23 
The subsequent adoption and ratification of the Sixth Amendment 
in the Bill of Rights reaffirmed the guarantee of the right to jury trial: 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”24 
However, neither the Article III nor the Sixth Amendment guar-
antee of the right to a jury trial applies to a military court-martial. The 
Founding Fathers exempted the Armed Forces from the Sixth Amend-
ment through language inserted in the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth 
Amendment excluded from its coverage “cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger.”25 The Supreme Court explained the relationship be-
tween the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: 
[The right to trial by jury]. . . is preserved to every one accused of 
crime who is not attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual 
service. The sixth amendment affirms that “in all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by 
an impartial jury,” language broad enough to embrace all persons and 
cases; but the fifth, recognizing the necessity of an indictment, or 
presentment, before any one can be held to answer for high crimes, 
excepts “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, 
when in actual service, in time of war or public danger,” and the fram-
ers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by jury, 
in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or 
presentment in the fifth.26  
. . . 
We think, therefore, that the power of Congress, in the government 
of the land and naval forces and of the militia, is not at all affected by 
the fifth or any other amendment.27 
 
 23.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mentor Book 1961). 
 24.  U.S CONST. amend. VI (1789). The Seventh Amendment similarly preserved the 
right of trial by jury in civil cases. 
 25.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 26.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866) (emphasis added). 
 27.  Id. at 138 (emphasis added). 
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None of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were originally under-
stood to apply in any way to courts-martial.28 In fact, the Bill of Rights 
in 1792 was not deemed inconsistent with human slavery itself; most 
African-Americans were also denied its protections, as were Native 
Americans. 
The Constitution granted to Congress the power “To make Rules 
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”29 
The Supreme Court has given the exercise of this congressional power 
great deference. Congress has exercised its exclusive power to pre-
scribe the rules and rights, if any, to be enjoyed by a military accused. 
Accordingly, courts-martial are not courts under Article III of the 
Constitution. In an early case shortly after the adoption of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice in 1951, the newly created Court of Military 
Appeals, in speaking of military due process, declared: “The rights and 
privileges of ‘military due process’ are based on the laws as enacted by 
Congress and not on the Constitution,”30 and “we need not concern 
ourselves with the constitutional concepts.”31 
More recently, however, appellate courts have exercised the habit 
of freely citing to Supreme Court decisions as if the Bill of Rights were 
directly applicable to courts-martial, with the result that the statutory 
rights of a military accused now often have a content that is identical 
to the constitutional protections afforded to civilians. Yet the one key 
ingredient that remains missing is the right to trial by jury, and a mil-
itary accused’s rights, however plentiful they may be, are meaningless 
if they do not protect him from inaccurate fact-finding. The court-
martial, despite its name, is not a court of justice in the traditional, 
 
 28.  Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 
II, 72 HARV. L. REV. 266, 284 (1958) (“The survey of actual practice made herein has shown that 
at least five other guarantees in the Bill of Rights were either denied the serviceman entirely at 
the outset or else very substantially curtailed: the right to petition for redress against grievances, 
and protection against searches and seizures, denied in practice; freedom of speech and the right 
to confrontation, denied by statute; and pre-eminently, the right to the assistance of counsel, 
denied inferentially by statute and absolutely in practice. Indeed, the most striking feature of the 
survey just completed is that for over half a century after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, its 
provisions were never invoked in a military situation save in a single instance, the trial of General 
Hull, and that the denial of its applicability to the military on that occasion was approved by no 
less an authority than the father of the Bill of Rights himself [President James Madison].”). 
 29.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14. 
 30.  United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (C.M.A. 1951). 
 31.  Id. at 79. 
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constitutional sense, but is tolerated as an indispensable tool for the 
preservation of good order and discipline in the U.S. Armed Forces. 
Part II: The Court-Martial as a Disciplinary Tool 
If the highly distinguished jurist William Blackstone was effusive 
in his praise of the English right to jury trial, he was also entirely un-
flattering in his observation of British courts-martial, upon which the 
U.S. military justice system was originally built: 
Martial law, which is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely 
arbitrary in its decisions, is . . . in truth and reality no law, but some-
thing indulged rather than allowed as law. The necessity of order and 
discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it counte-
nance.32 
Another English commentator, Sir Matthew Hale, described Brit-
ish military law in early seventeenth century England as “the arbitrary 
right to punish or destroy, without legal trial, any assumed delin-
quent.”33 Such pronouncements may surprise us today, especially in 
light of contemporary practice, because military justice has developed, 
in some areas, to more closely resemble the federal and state judicial 
systems. 
Hale made three important observations about British military 
law, which were accurate when the Founding Fathers adopted the Brit-
ish Articles of War, and are still largely relevant today: 
But touching the Business of Martial Law, these Things are to be 
observed, viz. 
First, That in Truth and Reality it is not a Law, but something in-
dulged rather than allowed as a Law; the Necessity of Government, 
Order and Discipline in an Army, is that only which can give those 
Laws a Countenance, Quod enim Necessitas cogit desendi. 
Secondly, This indulged Law was only to extend to Members of the 
army, or to those of the opposite Army, . . . and never was so much 
indulged as intended to be (executed or) exercised upon others; for 
 
 32.  WINTHROP’S MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 47 n.15 (2d ed. Reprint 1920) 
(1896)[hereinafter WINTHROP’S MILITARY LAW] (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 413 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992)(1765)). 
 33.  M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 26–27, quoted in Loving 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 766 (1996). 
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others who were not listed under the Army, had no Colour of Reason 
to be bound by Military Constitutions, applicable only to the Army, 
whereof they were not Parts; but they were to be order’d and gov-
ern’d according to the Laws to which they were subject, though it 
were a Time of War. 
Thirdly, That the Exercise of Martial Law, whereby any Person 
should lose his Life or Member, or Liberty, may not be permitted in 
Time of Peace, when the King’s Courts are open for all Persons to 
receive Justice, according to the Laws of the Land.34 
These three points deserve some elaboration. 
1. That in truth and reality it is not law, but something indulged 
rather than allowed as Law; 
The Founding Fathers, who revered the common law, had no illu-
sion about the nature of British martial law, which they adopted as 
their own. Writing nearly one-and-a-half centuries after the Ameri-
cans adopted British martial law, a Yale law professor concluded, “the 
fact remains that many of the concepts of the existing law military are 
so foreign to American jurisprudence, as to startle and perplex the 
American lawyer.”35 The Continental Congress in 1775 adopted the 
British Articles of War of 1765 without fundamental change. John Ad-
ams directly explained why: 
There was extant one system of articles of war, which had carried two 
empires to the head of command, the Roman and the British, for the 
British Articles of war were only a literal translation of the Roman. . . . 
I was therefore for reporting the British articles totidem verbis. . . . 
The British articles were accordingly reported.36 
 
 34.  M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 26–27, reprinted in PHILIP 
B. KURLAND AND RALPH LERNER, 5 THE FOUNDING FATHERS’ CONSTITUTION 247–48 
(Univ. Chicago Press 1987). 
 35.  Edmund M. Morgan, The Existing Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 
29 YALE L.J. 52, 52–53 (1919). The Yale Law professor was bothered by two aspects of martial 
law: one was the “remarkable indefiniteness” of martial law’s content and the other was the pro-
cedural peculiarities of the military system, of which the court-martial panel featured promi-
nently. 
 36.  Id. at 52 n.1 (quoting CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS (1850) 
93). 
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The Founding Fathers, having pledged their lives and their for-
tunes in declaring independence from Great Britain, needed the Con-
tinental Army to develop into a highly effective fighting force. They 
saw the intrinsic value of the British Articles of War as a means to in-
still good order and discipline into the Continental Army, which it 
needed if it was to prevail against the formidable British armed forces. 
The Articles of War were apparently so successful that, since their 
adoption in 1775, Congress only slightly modified them in 1776, in 
1806, in 1874, and, again, in 1916 with no significant changes until the 
adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950.37 
2. This indulged Law was only to extend to Members of the army; 
An entire class of American citizens—members of the armed 
forces—are currently excluded from the protections of the Bill of 
Rights contained within the U.S. Constitution. The professional sol-
dier, unless conscripted, was one who had enlisted of his own free will 
and had voluntarily subjected himself to a discipline that was incon-
sistent with the freedom of a citizen. Blackstone described military ser-
vice as a “state of servitude in the midst of a nation of freemen.”38 Sol-
diers were not well paid and they did not enjoy the highest regard.39 In 
eighteenth century England, at least, “soldiers, as a class, were des-
pised.”40 By contrast, the U.S. military today is one of the most highly 
respected institutions in American society. 
At first, membership in the Armed Forces was not a numerically 
significant segment of society.41 Whereas, in 1794, the total number of 
U.S. persons subject to military law was a mere 3,692,42 at the peak of 
 
 37.  Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 
I, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 49 (1958)(concluding that neither the Sixth Amendment right to have the 
assistance of counsel nor the companion right of trial by jury was ever “thought or intended or 
considered, by those who drafted the sixth amendment or by those who lived contemporaneously 
with its adoption, to apply to prosecutions before courts-martial.”). 
 38.  Wiener, The Original Practice II, supra note 28, at 293 (quoting 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 417 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992)(1765)). 
 39.  Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel: Hearing on S. 260 Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 2 (1962). 
 40.  Wiener, The Original Practice II, supra note 28, at 292 (citing MAITLAND, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 453 (1908)). 
 41.  Wiener, The Original Practice I, supra note 37 at 8. 
 42.  Id. at 9. 
WILLIAMS.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:03 PM 
471]  Safeguarding the Commander's Authority 
481 
the World War II mobilization in the 1940s, over 12 million persons 
were subject to military law, and the armed forces handled one-third 
of all criminal cases tried by the Nation.43 Those demographics would 
compel numerous changes in martial law. The American public began 
to see members of the armed forces more as citizen-soldiers who were 
performing their obligations of citizenship, rather than merely as pro-
fessional soldiers who had indentured themselves into servitude by, in 
essence, bargaining away their constitutional rights for the privilege of 
military service and duty. While the public fully appreciated that dis-
cipline was essential to military efficiency, it also questioned whether 
justice and discipline were so incompatible that its citizen-soldiers 
should be relegated to second-class constitutional status. 
3. That the Exercise of Martial Law. . . may not be permitted. . . when 
the. . . Courts are open for all Persons to receive Justice, according to the 
Laws of this Land. 
The Founding Fathers, who were familiar with and revered the 
right to trial by a jury of one’s peers, knew that courts-martial were not 
compatible with the American ideal of justice. They authorized them 
only as a necessary evil in pursuit of a greater good. The Founding 
Fathers decided that the court-martial should be used solely for disci-
plinary matters, but that general crimes committed by military mem-
bers should be tried in federal or state courts where the right to trial 
by jury was available. 
The court-martial was primarily available to address solely “disci-
plinary” types of offenses. Obedience to military orders and regula-
tions was, and still is, considered essential to the efficiency of the ser-
vice. General George Washington astutely observed, “Discipline is the 
soul of an army.”44 Members of the armed forces could be punished for 
committing disciplinary types of offenses—for example, insubordina-
tion, desertion, and dereliction of duty—even if these offenses could 
never be considered crimes when committed by civilians. On the other 
hand, the military could not function unless it had the ability to de-
mand total obedience, particularly during hostilities, and the court-
 
 43.  Id. at 11 (citations omitted). 
 44.  General George Washington, Instructions to Company Captains (July 29, 1757), ac-
cessible at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-04-02-0223. 
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martial power was at first limited to the trial of those offenses actually 
affecting good order and discipline. 
The court-martial also had the power to punish general crimes, 
but only when they impacted the military. The 1775 and 1776 Articles 
of War permitted trial by court-martial for all crimes that were not 
capital offenses as well as all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of 
good order and military discipline.45 If military offenders were accused 
of committing crimes “punishable by the known laws of the land,” the 
commanding officer had a duty “to use his utmost endeavors to deliver 
over such accused person or persons to the civil magistrate” for trial, 
under pain of being discharged himself.46 The Articles of War thus ex-
pressed a strong preference for the trial of common law crimes in ci-
vilian courts where the military member’s rights, to include a right to 
a jury trial, would have been honored.47 The Articles gave civilian 
courts, “if not a supremacy of jurisdiction, at least a primary power to 
proceed against military offenders violating the civil law, although the 
same acts were concurrently within the jurisdiction of the military 
courts.”48 Military members thus retained their Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial for general crimes. 
At first, general crimes were seldom tried by court-martial when a 
civilian court was available. The jurisdictional scope of the original Ar-
ticles of War, from about 1776 until the Civil War, was generally lim-
ited to specific military-unique offenses, such as desertion, absence 
without leave, mutiny, war offenses, and making false official state-
ments.49 None of these offenses were crimes at common law. With few 
exceptions, such as larceny or embezzlement of military stores or riot-
ing, the trials of common-law felonies were not mentioned in official 
records.50 The military did not have jurisdiction if a crime was com-
mitted against a person wholly unconnected to the military, or if no 
military order or rule of discipline was violated. 
 
 45.  ARTICLES OF WAR OF 1775, art. L; ARTICLES OF WAR OF 1776, §XVIII, art. 5. 
 46.  Id.; see also Wiener, The Original Practice II, supra note 28, at 10 (citing Arts. of 1776, 
§ 10, art. 1). 
 47.  See THE AMERICAN ARTICLES OF WAR OF 1776 § X, art. 1, reprinted in WINTHROP’S 
MILITARY LAW at 964. 
 48.  Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 382 (1920). 
 49.  Wiener, The Original Practice II, supra note 28, at 10. 
 50.  Id. 
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The scope of offenses triable by courts-martial gradually broad-
ened. During the Civil War in 1863, common-law felonies, including 
capital ones, were made punishable in time of war, insurrection, and 
rebellion.51 Congress, out of pragmatic concern that civilian courts 
could not function in all places during hostilities, expanded the juris-
diction of courts-martial.52 By 1916, common-law felonies were made 
military offenses at all times, except for murder and rape.53 
In 1950, following World War II, Congress enacted the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) applicable to all the military services. 
The UCMJ removed all existing limitations so that even murder and 
rape committed by military personnel were triable by courts-martial at 
all times. The UCMJ broadly authorized courts-martial for all crimes 
and even made a provision for the assimilation of those it did not enu-
merate. Even then, however, court-martial jurisdiction over military 
members was constitutionally limited by the Supreme Court to the 
trial of offenses with a genuine “service connection.”54 Because court-
martial jurisdiction was still limited to “service connected” offenses, 
military members still enjoyed the right to trial by jury for offenses 
tried in civilian courts. 
The enlargement of courts-martial jurisdiction over military mem-
bers, however, became absolute when the Supreme Court abandoned 
the “service connection” limitation in the landmark decision of Solorio 
v. United States.55 In Solorio, the Court held that a person’s status as a 
military member, and not the service connection of the offense, was 
the sole test for determining whether a court-martial had in personam 
jurisdiction to try him for the offense. With Solorio, the expansion of 
courts-martial jurisdiction became complete and universal for military 
members. As the jurisdictional reach of the court-martial expanded, 
the practical effect was that the soldier’s and sailor’s Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury was correspondingly diminished, because civil of-
fenses committed by military members formerly triable only in civilian 
 
 51.  Id. at 12. 
 52.  See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 753 (1996). 
 53.  Wiener, The Original Practice II, supra note 28, at 12. 
 54.  O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); see also United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 
337, 339 (C.M.A. 1980). 
 55.  Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 442, 47 (1987) (expressly overruling O’Calla-
han). 
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courts were now triable by courts-martial. In addition, the military’s 
policy, in the interests of enforcing good order and discipline, is to 
maximize its jurisdiction—even when civilian authorities may be inter-
ested in trying the case.56 
With the expansion of court-martial jurisdiction, the collateral 
consequences of a court-martial conviction are now essentially the 
same as those of the civilian justice system. Today, for example, per-
sons convicted by courts-martial have their convictions registered on 
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), and they are subject 
to mandatory supervised release, DNA processing, and sex offender 
registration. They lose the right to vote, the right to purchase and own 
firearms, veteran entitlements, retirement eligibility, parental rights, 
and public employment eligibility.57 Sentences imposed by a general 
or special court-martial are generally considered federal convictions 
and are included in an offender’s criminal history under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, even when the convictions are for uniquely 
military offenses such as unauthorized absence.58 
Over a hundred years ago in 1896, Colonel William Winthrop, 
whom the Supreme Court called “the Blackstone of Military Law,”59 
made this observation: 
[Courts-martial] are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive 
power, provided by Congress for the President . . . to aid him in 
properly commanding the army and navy and ensuring discipline 
therein . . . . A court-martial is not a court . . . it is as much subject to 
the orders of a competent superior as is any military body or person.60 
The first part of this statement remains accurate and poignant to-
day. The role of the military commander in the court-martial process 
must remain paramount if the court-martial is to serve any useful pur-
pose in the Armed Forces. However, the second part is no longer 
 
 56.  See, e.g., Air Force Instruction 51-201, para. 2.6 (Administration of Military Justice 
Oct. 2, 2011) (Oct. 2 2011) (noting that Air Force authorities should foster relationships with 
local civilian authorities with a view toward maximizing Air Force jurisdiction). 
 57.  Jeff Walker, The Practical Consequences of a Court-Martial Conviction, THE ARMY 
LAWYER, Dec. 2001, 9–12. 
 58.  U.S.S.G. Manual, § 4A1.2(g); see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421 (7th 
Cir. 1997). For a more complete discussion of this problem, see Matthew S. Freedus & Eugene 
R. Fidell, Conviction by Special Courts-Martial: A Felony Conviction?, 15 Fed. Sent. R. 220 (2003). 
 59.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006). 
 60.  WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49 (2d ed. 1896). 
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strictly correct. Now, while the court-martial serves the ends of justice, 
it also performs the function of a court of law, even if the Sixth Amend-
ment Right to trial by jury is not available. Court-martial convictions 
for serious offenses, like rape and murder, result in the same heavy 
penalties and collateral consequences as are meted out in federal and 
state courts. In the absence of command oversight, these offenses 
should only be tried by real juries. 
PART III: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE JURY AND THE 
PANEL 
If the Uniform Code of Military Justice is to be reexamined with a 
view toward eliminating the commander’s authority to review the 
court-martial’s findings, Congress should also ensure that the court-
martial panel is properly structured to render accurate verdicts. A side-
by-side comparison of the features of federal and state juries and court-
martial panels will highlight the key differences between them, making 
plain the shortcomings of court-martial panels. 
At common law, the jury consists of twelve persons who are re-
quired to agree unanimously on the verdict. Federal juries are consti-
tutionally required to follow the common law. States juries, on the 
other hand, are now constitutionally required to do so only in part.61 
In addition, court-martial panels do not at all possess the jury’s com-
mon-law features. Yet the jury’s and the panel’s features materially af-
fect the quality of its deliberations and determinations. 
 
 61.  The disparity in the constitutional requirements for federal and state juries is best 
explained by the Supreme Court’s current reluctance to complete the task of fully incorporating 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Bill of Rights did not 
originally apply to the states, see, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial by jury does not apply to the states); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 
(1934) (same); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (same), but its provisions have over time 
been selectively incorporated by the Supreme Court into the Fourteenth Amendment. The in-
corporation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury only began in 1968 with the case of 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and is arguably not yet complete. 
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A. The Jury’s Role 
According to the Supreme Court, the jury places itself between the 
accused and his accuser in order to “prevent oppression by the govern-
ment.”62 A jury of one’s peers is “an inestimable safeguard against the 
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, 
or eccentric judge.”63 Unlike the prosecutor or the judge, the jury must 
be relied upon to supply “the commonsense judgment of a group of 
laymen.”64 The jury thus furnishes an important check against arbi-
trary prosecutions. The jury’s hallmark is in the “community partici-
pation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s deter-
mination of guilt or innocence.”65 Chief Justice Thomas Cooley of the 
Michigan Supreme Court summarized the jury’s role: 
The trial of criminal cases is by a jury of the country, and not by the 
court. The jurors, and they alone, are to judge of the facts, and weigh 
the evidence. The law has established this tribunal because it is be-
lieved that, from its numbers, the mode of their selection, and the 
fact that the jurors come from all classes of society, they are better 
calculated to judge of motives, weigh probabilities, and take what 
may be called a common sense view of a set of circumstances, involv-
ing both act and intent, than any single man, however pure, wise and 
eminent he may be. This is the theory of the law; and as applied to 
criminal accusations, it is eminently wise, and favorable alike to lib-
erty and to justice.66 
The jury’s commonsense judgment, arrived at through community 
participation and shared responsibility, permits the stridency of its de-
cisions to be accepted. 
B. Judge-Jury Disagreement 
The Supreme Court expressed a strong preference for the com-
monsense judgment of the community furnished by the jury over “the 
professional or perhaps over conditioned or biased response of a 
 
 62.  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 n.10 (1955)(quoting People v. 
Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 27). 
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judge.”67 This is a remarkable endorsement considering that judges 
and juries disagree on the guilt or innocence of an accused in twenty-
two percent of cases.68 This finding was reported in the most compre-
hensive study ever undertaken on juries, and published as The American 
Jury by H. Kalven and H. Zeisel of the University of Chicago.69 The 
now classic study has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court 
in fourteen of its published decisions.70 
According to The American Jury, judges and juries disagree in one 
out of every five cases.71 In nineteen percent of trials, the jury acquitted 
when the judge would have convicted the defendant. In only three per-
cent of trials, the judge would have acquitted when the jury convicted. 
The researchers examined those cases closely and learned that the dis-
agreement did not arise from the jury’s incompetence or unwillingness 
to follow the law. Rather, the disagreement had to do with the strength 
of the evidence in close cases.72 In nearly eighty percent of those cases, 
 
 67.  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 155-56 (1968)). 
 68.  H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58 (1966) [hereinafter The Amer-
ican Jury]. Judges and juries agreed that the defendant was guilty in sixty-four percent of the cases 
and not guilty in fourteen percent, thereby reaching agreement in seventy-eight percent of the 
cases. 
 69.  Although The American Jury was published in 1966, its conclusions have been remark-
ably revalidated by numerous studies conducted in 1987, in the 1990s, and in the early 2000s by 
other researchers, including by Valerie P. Hans and the National Center for State Courts, despite 
changes in the intervening years in trials, the law, new types of evidence, and the demographic 
makeup of juries that contain more women and minorities than juries in the 1950s. NEIL VIDMAR 
& VALERIE HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 149–51 (2007). 
 70.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987); Standefer v. U. S., 447 U.S. 10, 22-
23 (1980); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 235, 238 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 295 (1976); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 n.5 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 
406 U.S. 380, 389 n. 4, 391 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 377 n. 20 (1972); McGau-
tha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 n. 49 (1970); 
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74 n. 22 (1970); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 
n. 13 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 n. 24 (1968); United States v. Jackson, 390 
U.S. 570, 574 n. 8 (1968); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 565 n. 8 (1967). 
 71.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 68, at 58. 
 72.  Although there was often more than one reason in a given case for judge-jury disa-
greement, the weighted reasons for disagreement were, in order of prevalence, issues of evidence 
(54 percent), sentiments on the law (29 percent), sentiments on the defendant (11 percent), dis-
parity of counsel (4 percent), and facts only the judge knew (2 percent). Id. at 115. The researchers 
learned that, although judges and juries disagree four times as often in close cases than in clear 
cases, “there is virtually no difference between the frequency of disagreement when the case is 
easy and when the case is difficult; this holds true for the cases that are clear as well as for the 
close ones.” Id. at 157. According to the researchers, “The result is a stunning refutation of the 
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the jury disagreed with the judge because of a combination of a lack of 
evidence and the community’s notions of justice.73 This research is im-
portant because it demonstrates that jurors do not merely engage in 
simple fact-finding and nothing else, but as the triers of fact they also 
make value judgments based on societal norms of behavior.74 Jurors 
bring their common sense, life experience, beliefs, and knowledge of 
the ways of the world into the jury box. In short, the jury embodies the 
moral values of the community. 
The jury supplies the commonsense judgment of the community, 
because of its features—the manner in which jurors are selected, the 
number of jurors, and the requirement for unanimity for a verdict. 
C. The Jury Represents the Community 
According to the Supreme Court, “the selection of a petit jury 
from a representative cross section of the community is an essential 
component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”75 Juries, es-
pecially federal juries, are selected at random from a fair cross section 
of the community.76 The jury plays an important role in the admin-
istration of justice. A jury selected at random is best suited to this role.77 
The Report in the House of Representatives, which led to the pas-
sage of the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, stated: 
. . . the jury is designed not only to understand the case, but also to 
reflect the community’s sense of justice in deciding it. As long as 
there are significant departures from the cross sectional goal, biased 
 
hypothesis that the jury does not understand.” Id. 
 73.  In two percent of the cases, judges would have convicted based on information known 
to the judge but not disclosed to the jury. Id. at 121. This interesting statistic indicates that judges 
are not always able to compartmentalize information. 
 74.  The jury’s political function of applying community standards to factual determina-
tions is readily apparent in sexual assault cases. In these cases, the law recognizes only one issue 
other than the fact of sexual contact: whether there was consent at the moment of the contact. 
When sexual contact occurs in private without observers and the testimony of the participants is 
opposed on the issue of consent, the jury must scrutinize the participants’ prior history and be-
havior immediately before and after the moment of the sexual contact. Juries decide the issue of 
consent based on community standards regarding acceptable norms of behavior. See Id. at 249–
56; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 69, at 198–201. 
 75.  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). 
 76.  The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53, 28 U.S.C. 
1861 et seq. 
 77.  Taylor, 419 U.S. at 529–30 (citations omitted). 
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juries are the result—biased in the sense that they reflect a slanted 
view of the community they are supposed to represent.78 
The Senate Report stated, “A jury chosen from a representative 
community sample is a fundamental of our system of justice.”79 
The idea behind the cross-section goal is that people see and eval-
uate things differently, and one function of the jury is to bring the di-
vergent perceptions that exist in the community to the trial process.80 
Diversity promotes vigorous and fruitful discussion. Not only do per-
sons from different backgrounds bring unique insights to the deliber-
ations,81 but their mere presence brings out the best in other jurors.82 
If the jury is to speak authoritatively, it must itself reflect the commu-
nity at large and its values. Researchers found that diverse juries delib-
erate longer, discuss a wider range of information, and make more ac-
curate statements about the case.83 Thus, researchers have concluded, 
“Diverse juries have an edge in fact-finding, especially when the mat-
ters at issue incorporate social norms and judgments, as jury trials often 
do.”84 
The Supreme Court has set aside convictions when identifiable 
segments of society have been systematically excluded from the pool 
of available jurors.85 The Court was careful to note that the jurors 
seated to try the case after being examined by the trial court need not 
mirror the community or reflect various distinctive groups, but they 
 
 78.  H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 1797 (1968). 
 79.  S. REP. NO. 90-891,  (1967) (quoted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 n. 8 
(1975)). 
 80.  H. Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 710, 715 n.33 (1971) (“This is perhaps more true today than it was at the time the 
jury grew into a legal institution. Originally, the emphasis was directed more towards the differ-
ence between the jury and the judges as the representatives of the King, and less towards the 
differences among jurors.”). 
 81.  See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1261 (2000) (arguing that the lack of diversity of juries diminishes the quality of their delibera-
tions and decisions). 
 82.  Valerie P. Hans, Deliberations and Dissent: 12 Angry Men Versus the Empirical Reality of 
Juries, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 586 (2007) (“Compared to all-white juries, whites in racially 
mixed juries were more systematic and accurate, bringing up more issues in the deliberation. 
Thus whites behaved differently when they were in homogeneous and mixed juries.”). 
 83.  VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 69, at 340. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (exclusion of women). 
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must be randomly selected in the first instance.86 In setting aside the 
convictions for improper jury selection, the Court has not had to find 
anything wrong with the trial process itself. The systemic flaw in the 
jury’s selection was enough for the Court to set aside the conviction. 
D. Panel Members are Individually Selected 
The method of selecting panel members has met severe criticism. 
According to Judge Cox, it is “the most vulnerable aspect of the court-
martial system; the easiest for critics to attack.”87 In fact, the U.S. 
Court of Military Appeals invited Congress to reexamine the panel 
member selection process: “Constitutional questions aside, the per-
ceived fairness of the military justice system would be enhanced im-
measurably by congressional reexamination of the presently utilized 
jury selection process.” 88 However, Congress did not accept this invi-
tation. 
The UCMJ gives the commander great latitude in picking panel 
members. Under Article 25, UCMJ, the commander individually se-
lects those panel members who, “in his opinion, are best qualified for 
the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of 
service, and judicial temperament.”89 The U.S. Court of Military Ap-
peals has made clear that Article 25, UCMJ, does not contemplate that 
the court-martial panel will be a representative cross-section of the 
military community.90 For instance, in all cases, panel members must 
outrank the accused.91 Most important, however, is the fact that panel 
 
 86.  Id. at 538. 
 87.  United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242, 252 (C.M.A. 1988) (Cox, J., concurring). For 
scholarly criticisms of the selection process, see 1 Francis A. Gilligan & Frederic I. Lederer, 
Court-Martial Procedure § 15-31.00 (1991) (“Arguably, the most critical and least necessary ves-
tige of the historical origins of the military criminal legal system is the personal appointment of 
the members by the convening authority.”); Stephen A. Lamb, The Court-Martial Panel Selection 
Process: A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103 (1992); David A. Schlueter, The Twentieth Annual 
Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Military Justice for the 1990’s—A Legal System Looking for Respect, 133 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1991); Gary C. Smallridge, The Military Jury Selection Reform Movement, 
19 A.F. L. REV. 343 (1978); James A. Young, Revising the Court Member Selection Process, 163 MIL. 
L. REV. 91 (2000). 
 88.  United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, n.3 (C.M.A. 1976). 
 89.  UCMJ, art. 25 (emphasis added). 
 90.  United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242, 248 (C.M.A. 1988). 
 91.  UCMJ, art. 25(d)(1). 
WILLIAMS.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:03 PM 
471]  Safeguarding the Commander's Authority 
491 
members are not the accused’s peers or equals. Further, they are not 
randomly selected from a cross-section of the military community, 
much less the community at large. 
After the panel members have been selected by the convening au-
thority, they may be examined and challenged. Both the prosecution 
and the defense may challenge any and all panel members who are or 
may be biased. In addition, each side is entitled to exercise one per-
emptory challenge against a panel member for any or no reason.92 But 
as Judge Cox notes, the commander picks the panel members, thereby 
giving the government “the functional equivalent of an unlimited 
number of peremptory challenges.”93 And as long as the total number 
of panel members does not go below a certain minimum, the com-
mander does not need to replace the panel members dismissed by the 
military judge. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that military panel members 
exhibit a “high degree of honesty and sense of justice which nearly all 
of them undoubtedly have.”94 But it also observed that court-martial 
panels “have not been and probably never can be constituted in such a 
way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Consti-
tution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts.”95 
According to the Court, laymen are better than specialists to perform 
the task of determining the guilt or innocence of an accused: 
Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the jury box 
a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits. Such 
juries may reach completely different conclusions than would be 
reached by specialists in any single field, including specialists in the 
military field. 
On many occasions, fully known to the Founders of this country, ju-
rors—plain people—have manfully stood up in defense of liberty 
 
 92.  Rule for Courts-Martial 912(g), Manual for Courts-Martial (2012). 
 93.  Smith, 27 M.J. at 252 (Cox, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Carter, 25 M.J. 
471, 478 (C.M.A. 1988)). 
 94.  United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (holding that a court-
martial has no jurisdiction or competence to try a former military member for a crime committed 
while on active duty); see also United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 180 (2001) (Crawford, C.J., 
dissenting) (referring to court-martial panels as “blue ribbon panels”). 
 95.  Toth, 350 U.S. at 17. Panels also do not have the same kind of qualifications deemed 
constitutionally essential to fair trials of civilians in state courts. 
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against the importunities of judges and despite prevailing hysteria 
and prejudices.96 
The Supreme Court is clear about the “great difference between 
trial by jury and trial by military members of the military forces.”97 The 
Court declared, “the proper functioning of the jury system, and indeed 
our democracy itself, requires that the jury be ‘a body truly representa-
tive of the community,’ and not the organ of any special group or 
class.”98 Community participation in the administration of justice is a 
part of our democratic heritage and is critical to public confidence in 
the whole judicial process. 
E. The Number of Jurors is Important 
The jury’s size will affect the quality of its deliberations. At com-
mon law, the jury consisted of twelve persons, which was large enough 
to represent the community and remain manageable. The more jurors 
on a jury, the greater the likelihood that the divergent views existing 
in the community will be represented on the jury. A large number of 
jurors is also important, because “the greater the number of persons 
 
 96.  Id. at 18–19 (footnotes omitted). 
 97.  Id. at 17–18. 
 98.  Id. (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942)). The Supreme Court 
has not limited its criticism of so-called elite juries to the court-martial panel. In Glasser, the 
Court expressed disapproval in the selection of women on the jury drawn from the membership 
list of the Illinois League of Women Voters. The women had all attended jury classes where 
lecturers had presented the views of the prosecution. The Court stated: 
The deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of particular private organi-
zations definitely does not conform to the traditional requirements of jury trial. No 
matter how high principled and imbued with a desire to inculcate public virtue such 
organizations may be, the dangers inherent in such a method of selection are the more 
real when the members of those organizations from training or otherwise acquire a 
bias in favor of the prosecution. The jury selected from the membership of such an 
organization is then not only the organ of a special class, but, in addition, it is also 
openly partisan. If such practices are to be countenanced, the hard won right of trial 
by jury becomes a thing of doubtful value, lacking one of the essential characteristics 
that have made it a cherished feature of our institutions. 
Id. at 86. As far back as 1938, the New York State Judicial Council conducted a study showing 
that special juries are more than twice as likely to convict a defendant, or in 80 percent of the 
cases, while ordinary juries convicted in only 40 percent of the cases. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 
69, at 69 n.12 (citing Fourth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of the State of New York 
(1938)). 
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entertaining a conclusion the greater the probability of that conclusion 
being sound and true.”99 
The federal jury must have twelve jurors, which is required by the 
Sixth Amendment.100 State juries, on the other hand, can be as small as 
six persons, “particularly if the requirement of unanimity is retained.”101 
Juries smaller than six persons, however, are inherently unreliable and 
therefore prohibited by the Constitution. Thus, in Ballew v. Georgia, 
the Supreme Court set aside the conviction by a five-person jury for 
being too small.102 The Supreme Court cited to research showing that 
progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group de-
liberation.103 In smaller groups, members are less likely to make critical 
contributions necessary for the solution to a problem, they are less 
likely to remember all of the important pieces of evidence or argument, 
and they are less likely to overcome the biases of its members to obtain 
an accurate result.104 Moreover, a juror in the minority will adhere to 
his position more frequently when he has at least one other person on 
the jury supporting his argument.105 The Court reasoned that a juror 
in the minority is more likely to have an ally on a twelve-person jury 
than on a six-person jury.106 
The Supreme Court also observed that the risk of an innocent per-
son being wrongly convicted also rises as the size of the jury dimin-
ishes.107 Studies showed that twelve-person juries rendered “correct” 
decisions more frequently (fourteen percentage points more often) 
than six-person juries, and twelve-person juries could be expected to 
reach extreme compromises considerably fewer times (only one-fourth 
 
 99. James R. Clark, Should Verdicts be Unanimous in Criminal Cases?, 46 A.B.A. REP. 591 
(1921), quoted in Hans Zeisel, Waiver of Jury Unanimity—Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21 
U. CHI. L. REV. 438, 445 n.53 (1954). 
 100.  Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (reversing conviction because federal 
jury did not have 12 men); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (reversing conviction because 
8-person jury violated the constitutional requirement of 12 jurors, as at common law) (overruled 
on grounds regarding the Ex Post Facto clause); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(1) (“A jury consists of 12 
persons. . . .”). 
 101.  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 102.  Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
 103.  Id. at 232. 
 104.  Id. at 233. 
 105.  Id. at 236 (citing Zeisel, supra note 80, at 720). 
 106.  Zeisel, supra note 80, at 719. 
 107.  Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 234. 
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as often) than six-person juries.108 These studies vindicate the six-hun-
dred year-old wisdom of the common law. 
The original Articles of War stated, “General courts-martial may 
consist of any number of members from five to thirteen; but they shall 
not consist of less than thirteen when that number can be convened 
without manifest injury to the service.”109 The British would detail 
more than 13 officers; sometimes as many as 25 officers.110 Perhaps the 
large number of panel members was supposed to make up for the fact 
they could convict by a simple majority. Today, however, the court-
martial panel is often smaller than even six persons. Under the UCMJ, 
a general court-martial panel can be as small as five members; the spe-
cial court-martial can consist of only three members, even though it 
can impose a sentence of imprisonment for up to one year.111 The cur-
rent court-martial panels are too small for effective deliberations. 
Though the number of panel members is small and their mode of 
selection has been criticized, the panel’s most pernicious feature is that 
the members do not have to unanimously agree on the findings. 
F. The Importance of a Unanimous Verdict 
For over six centuries, unanimity of twelve jurors was the essential 
feature of jury trials at common law. As early as 1367, an English Court 
refused to accept an eleven-to-one guilty vote after the lone holdout 
stated he would rather die in prison than vote to convict.112 As Black-
stone reminds us, no one could be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
“but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and equals.”113 
John Adams left no doubt as to which common-law feature of a jury 
 
 108.  Id. at 235. 
 109.  WINTHROP’S MILITARY LAW, supra note 32, at 77; ARTICLES OF WAR OF 1775, art. 
64. 
 110.  WINTHROP’S MILITARY LAW, supra note 32, at 77. 
 111. The right to a trial by jury is triggered whenever a person has been charged with a 
serious offense as opposed to a petty offense. A serious offense is one where the defendant can 
receive a sentence greater than six months. New York v. Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). In requir-
ing that the right to jury trial attach for serious offenses, the Court in Baldwin rejected the sug-
gestion that the distinction be made between felonies and misdemeanors. 
 112. ABRAMSON, supra note 11, at 179. 
 113. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 142–43 (1951) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 227–29 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992)(1765)) 
(emphasis added). 
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was most important: “it is the unanimity of the jury that preserves the 
rights of mankind.”114 
According to The American Jury, only one-third of all juries in 
criminal cases reach agreement on the first ballot.115 The other two-
thirds find their vote split and must continue to deliberate to reach a 
verdict. Research also shows that jurors voting in the minority on the 
first ballot succeed in persuading an initial majority in a significant 
number of cases—about ten percent.116 The jury’s consideration of mi-
nority viewpoints in its deliberations is therefore critical to the accu-
racy of its determinations. The very object of a jury system is to secure 
unanimity by a comparison of views and by agreement among the ju-
rors themselves. As jurors sift and weigh the evidence, the discussion 
inevitably prompts a reevaluation of the case and a changing of opin-
ions. Because the verdict must be unanimous, jurors may vote several 
times to assess the state of their agreement until they reach a verdict. 
Unlike Federal juries, which must be unanimous, the Supreme 
Court has held that state juries do not always have to follow the una-
nimity rule.117 Even so, only two states, Louisiana and Oregon, permit 
their juries to render verdicts on felonies without a unanimous vote. 
Both Louisiana and Oregon require at least ten of its twelve jurors 
(eighty-three percent) to agree on the verdict.118 Thus, no state jury 
can convict on a felony with a vote as low as the court-martial panel’s 
two-thirds concurrence. 
The number of persons serving on a jury and a unanimity require-
ment are interrelated. Although the Supreme Court permits state ju-
ries to convict by a supermajority or to be smaller than twelve persons, 
the Court has also held that the fewer the jurors serving on a state jury, 
the greater the need for the jury to be unanimous. Thus, in Burch v. 
 
 114. 1 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 376 (1797) (emphasis added). 
 115. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 68, at 462, 487. 
 116. Id. at 490. 
 117. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (jury verdict was 11–1, or 91 percent); John-
son v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (jury verdict was 9–3, or 75 percent). Louisiana now re-
quires a 10–2, or 83percent, implicitly acknowledging that a 9–3 verdict is too weak a standard. 
LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17. 
 118. OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2013); LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2013). 
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Louisiana the Supreme Court set aside a conviction when the six-mem-
ber jury was not unanimous.119 If only five of six jurors had voted for 
conviction (an eighty-three percent concurrence), then the jury was 
effectively reduced in size to a jury of five. The Court had previously 
held in Ballew v. Georgia that a jury of five is too small for the jury to 
function properly or to achieve accurate results.120 
But the problem with a mixed verdict is even greater than a mere 
reduction in the jury’s size. According to Professor Zeisel, a principal 
author of THE AMERICAN JURY: 
The important element to observe is that the abandonment of the 
unanimity rule is but another way of reducing the size of the jury. But 
it is reduction with a vengeance, for a majority verdict requirement is 
far more effective in nullifying the potency of minority viewpoints 
than is the outright reduction of a jury to a size equivalent to the 
majority that is allowed to agree on a verdict. Minority viewpoints 
fare better on a jury of ten that must be unanimous than on a jury of 
twelve where ten members must agree on a verdict.121 
Minority viewpoints fare worse when a majority is allowed to agree on 
a verdict, because the majority jurors will often choose to ignore the 
minority viewpoints as soon as they reach the requisite number of votes 
for a verdict. When unanimity is required, no viewpoint can be ig-
nored. 
According to The American Jury, when unanimity is required, the 
rate at which criminal juries hang, or not reach agreement, is 5.6 per-
cent.122 When the jury hangs by one or two jurors, the rate is only 2.4 
percent.123 When a majority vote is permitted, the rate at which they 
will hang is still 3.1 percent, or 45 percent fewer hung juries than those 
that require unanimity.124 The inference is clear: one or two jurors do 
not hang the majority of hung juries, reflecting significant disagree-
ment among the jurors. “Yet in Oregon, which allows 10–2 verdicts” 
and which requires that the vote be disclosed when it is not unanimous, 
“the number of juries rendering verdicts with one or two holdouts is 
 
 119. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979). 
 120. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
 121. Zeisel, supra note 80, at 722 (emphasis added). 
 122. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 68, at 460. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 461. 
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25 percent of all juries.”125 The experience of Oregon juries provides 
evidence that the jurors in the majority will ignore the minority view-
points and end their deliberations once the minimum number for a 
quorum is reached.126 
Because court-martial panels can vote to convict by a mere two-
thirds concurrence—a low threshold—the majority can ignore minor-
ity viewpoints to a degree not seen on even state juries. They can 
choose to end their deliberations at any time. Professor Zeisel has 
asked, “One might wonder why the men who drafted the rules for this 
type of court martial jury went to the extreme. Might one of their mo-
tives have been that such a jury, more than any other, could be ex-
pected to circumvent or conceal a disturbing minority position?”127 
The final vote of a court-martial panel is not known because the ver-
dict announcement permits the panel to hide the fact that its finding 
may not have been unanimous. The formula for announcing the ver-
dict reads: “[T]his court-martial finds you . . . .”128 
The unanimity rule ensures that all viewpoints are fully vetted and 
considered. The unanimity rule would help the panel identify the pre-
cise moment when deliberations can end. When unanimity is not re-
quired, the panel members must make a judgment call about when to 
take a formal ballot. With the two-thirds concurrence rule, delibera-
tions can end prematurely. Any efficiency gained through shorter de-
liberations cannot be a sufficient reason to overcome concerns about 









 125. ABRAMSON, supra note 11, at 199. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Zeisel, supra note 80, at 723. 
 128. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, app. 10 (2012 ed.). 
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G. Overblown Concerns About the Potential for Hung Panels 
The court-martial panel was adopted to secure justice swiftly.129 
One perceived benefit of the panel is that it can never “hang”—or fail 
to reach a verdict—due to a lack of agreement among its members. 
The panel must either vote to convict, which it can do with a two-
thirds concurrence, or its vote automatically results in an acquittal. De-
spite the low level of agreement needed for conviction, it is thought 
that this decision rule also greatly benefits the accused. 
According to The American Jury, the probability a jury will hang 
grows almost exponentially the longer a jury deliberates beyond two 
 
 129. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (“A court-martial is not yet an 
independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the 
overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.”); United States ex. rel. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955) (“Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within 
the military ranks there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience and 
order.”). 
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hours.130 This finding is interesting because many panels deliberate 
longer than two hours. The long deliberation times of panels may in-
dicate a lack of unanimity. Professor Zeisel commented on the lengthy 
deliberation of the court-martial panel that tried Lieutenant Calley af-
ter the My Lai affair in Vietnam: 
A significant characteristic of this Calley-type jury is its ability to hide 
the fact that the jury’s findings may not have been unanimous; 
whether the verdict of the Calley jury was unanimous is still un-
known. . . . The reason for the extraordinary length of the Calley 
jury’s deliberation may have been its desire to achieve unanimity in a 
trial for a capital offense, even if that aspect of the verdict remained 
unpublished.131 
Many mistakenly believe that the “hung” jury often results from a 
single, erratic or unreasonable juror who obstinately refuses to listen 
to others.132 But juries rarely hang because of only one or two holdout 
jurors. “[J]uries which begin with an overwhelming majority,” either 
for conviction or acquittal, “are not likely to hang.”133 “It requires a 
[sizable] minority of [four] or [five] jurors at the first vote to develop 
the likelihood of a hung jury.”134 Because most hung juries have a siz-
able minority on the first ballot, the primary reason for a hung jury 
 
 130. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 68, at 459. 
 131. Zeisel, supra note 80, at 723–24. 
 132. To break deadlock, many trial judges will try to persuade holdout jurors to reevaluate 
the case through a jury instruction: 
. . . [T]hat in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that 
although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere ac-
quiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question sub-
mitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each 
other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that 
they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other’s arguments; that, 
if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider 
whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of 
so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, 
the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they 
might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in 
by the majority. 
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). The problem with the Allen instruction is that 
the judge signals his agreement with the majority viewpoint without knowing what it is. “[T]he 
probability that an acquittal minority will hang the jury is about as great as a guilty minority will 
hang it.” KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 68, at 461. 
 133. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 68, at 462. 
 134. Id. 
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will be the ambiguity of the case and not the popular notion of a single 
eccentric juror who refuses to listen to and consider the views of the 
majority.135 
One study found that “one-third of [the criminal cases] that re-
sulted in a hung jury were re-tried to a new jury.”136 A small percentage 
(2.4 percent) were retried in a bench trial.137 The remaining cases were 
disposed of by plea agreements or dismissals.138 “Retrials [of cases] to 
a new jury . . . mirror the distribution of original jury outcomes almost 
perfectly.”139 Statistically, in the felony cases studied, the original jury 
convicted in 54.9 percent of the cases, acquitted in 14.5 percent, and 
hung in 4.8 percent of the cases.140 When the “hung” cases were re-
tried, the new jury convicted in 69 percent of the cases, acquitted in 19 
percent, and “hung” again in nearly 7 percent of the cases.141 These 
findings undermine the popular notion that but for the unreasonable 
juror on the original jury, the jury would not have hung.142 
Researchers from Northwestern University were recently permit-
ted to observe the deliberations of fifty juries in Arizona.143 Prior to 
this study, no one had ever been allowed to watch actual delibera-
tions.144 The Arizona Supreme Court permitted researchers from 1998 
to 2001 to videotape the civil trials, including their deliberations.145 
 
 135. Id. at 462–63. 
 136. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 82–84 (2002). 
 137. Id. at 26. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 27. 
 140. Id. at 21. According to the National Institute of Justice, there were also mistrials for 
reasons other than a “hung” jury in 3.1 percent of the cases, and it was unknown what had hap-
pened in the remaining 14.5 percent of the cases. 
 141. Id. at 27. Retried cases also resulted in mistrial in 4 percent of the cases. 
 142. Id. at 84. 
 143. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity Re-
quirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006). 
 144. The authors of The American Jury had recorded jury deliberations in five civil cases 
with the consent of the trial judge and counsel, but without the knowledge of the jurors. When 
this fact was discovered, it resulted in a national scandal, to include congressional hearings and 
public censure by the Attorney General of the United States. The authors provided assurances 
to Congress and the Attorney General that their published study would not include any observa-
tions from those recordings. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 68, at vi-vii. 
 145. Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 143 at 204 n. 20 (citing Supreme Court of Ar-
izona Administrative Order 98–10, available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/orders/ad-
morder/orders99/pdf98/9810.pdf)(authorizing the civil jury filming project). 
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They did so with the written consent of the judges, the jurors, and the 
parties.146 The researchers also provided questionnaires to judges and 
jurors, and had access to documents and court exhibits, so that they 
could fully assess juror behavior.147 This study was also significant be-
cause civil juries in Arizona do not have to be unanimous. 
The researchers found that juries did not reach unanimity in one-
third of the cases.148 They examined those cases and found that the 
majority jurors and the holdouts both recalled seeing and hearing sub-
stantially the same evidence, but they interpreted it differently: 
Although the majority in each of these cases took a different view of 
the evidence or the appropriate level or care, in none of the cases did 
the minority jurors indicate errors in recall or a misunderstanding of 
the legal framework in justifying their positions. The disagreements 
did not arise from confusion about the content of the evidence, but 
rather from conflict over how to interpret it and which witness to 
believe.149 
The jurors thus differed over the credibility of the witnesses and 
the behavior of the parties, precisely the types of issues that are most 
appropriately determined by a properly constituted jury. 
Significantly, the researchers did not find a single instance in which 
the outvoted juror had advocated indefensible positions.150 In one case, 
it was the holdout juror who correctly interpreted the trial judge’s 
somewhat confusing instruction, but the juror was ignored “[w]hen a 
vote revealed that the majority had enough votes for a . . . verdict.”151 
The trial judges who presided over the cases would have reached the 
same verdict as the holdout jurors almost as often as they would have 
done so with the majority jurors,152 a finding that debunks the popular 
myth that holdout jurors are eccentric and unreasonable. From this 
research, it is evident that the deliberation process can be strengthened 
when every viewpoint must be considered. 
 
 146. Id. The Administrative Order requires that all parties and jurors execute a consent 
form approved by the chief justice. Id. 
 147. Id. at 204–05 n.22. 
 148. Id. at 212. 
 149.  Id. at 220 (footnotes omitted). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 221. 
 152.  Id. at 221–22. 
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H. The Concurrence Requirement’s Other Evil 
Lord Patrick Devlin once observed that trial by jury “is a process 
designed to make it as sure as possible that no innocent man is con-
victed.”153 The court-martial panel is not designed to do so. Ironically, 
the panel’s design can lead to yet another evil. 
The low concurrence needed for a guilty verdict also heightens the 
risk that the panel will acquit guilty persons at a higher rate than would 
be possible if unanimity is required. Recall that, according to The 
American Jury, the probability that a juror is holding out for acquittal 
is about the same as the probability that a juror is holding out for a 
conviction.154 While some panel members may be ready to acquit an 
accused, other panel members may want to discuss a critical fact they 
believe cannot easily be explained away if the accused is to be acquitted. 
The viewpoints of these other panel members can also be ignored, not 
by a two-thirds concurrence of the other panel members, but by any 
number of panel members greater than one-third of the panel. It takes 
a two-thirds concurrence to convict. If a two-thirds concurrence for 
conviction is not reached when a formal ballot is taken, the accused is 
automatically acquitted, even if a majority of the panel members are 
convinced of the accused’s guilt. 
The panel is too small to function properly, it does not represent 
the community, and it does not follow the unanimity rule. Under the 
two-thirds concurrence rule, the innocent may be convicted and the 
guilty acquitted. Since the panel’s features affect the quality of its de-
cision-making, the panel’s verdict cannot be equated with that of a 
jury. Congress made up for this deficiency by providing a safeguard—
a check and balance.155 
 
 153.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 68, at 190. 
 154.  Id. at 461. 
 155.  In federal and state court, the defendant’s interest in the chosen jury is so strong that 
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy attaches when the jury is empanelled 
and sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (applying the federal rule governing the time when 
jeopardy attaches to the states). Because courts-martial do not have true juries, jeopardy attaches 
when the first witness is sworn, without regard to whether the accused is tried before a panel or 
a military judge sitting alone. UCMJ, art. 44(c) (Former Jeopardy). For purposes of double jeop-
ardy, every court-martial is treated the same as a federal or state prosecution tried without a jury. 
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PART IV: SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE PANEL’S STRUCTURAL 
FLAWS 
With the court-martial panel structurally unsound, Congress had 
to enact a safeguard to make up for the panel’s critical shortcomings. 
The safeguard is as unorthodox in the American scheme of justice as it 
is now controversial. The safeguard does not exist in federal or state 
practice. There is no need for it there. 
Once the jury makes its factual determinations on the question of 
guilt or innocence, the verdict must not be disturbed on appeal, absent 
legal error or newly discovered evidence. The power to overturn a 
jury’s verdict in the absence of legal error or newly discovered evidence 
undermines the jury as a legal institution.156 Because the court-martial 
panel’s features fall short of federal and state juries, Congress chose to 
offer the accused some level of protection against the panel’s unsup-
ported findings by giving commanders the authority to review the 
panel’s findings.157 As an additional safeguard, Congress also gave the 
courts of criminal appeals a similar authority to review the findings.158 
Since the founding of the Nation, a court-martial has never been 
considered final until the commander who convened it has approved 
the findings and sentence. There was a time when the President him-
self was the reviewing authority in certain types of cases. The Supreme 
Court explained the importance of this statutory role: 
[T]he action required of the president is judicial in character, not ad-
ministrative. As Commander-in-Chief of the Army he has been made 
by law the person whose duty it is to review the proceedings of 
courts-martial in cases of this kind. This implies that he is himself to 
consider the proceedings laid before him, and decide personally 
whether they ought to be carried into effect. Such a power he cannot 
delegate. His personal judgment is required, as much so as it would 
 
 156.  Senator McCaskill identified the commander’s authority to review the findings as “the 
crux of the problem here.” Proposed Fiscal 2014 Defense Authorization as it Relates to the U.S. Air 
Force Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, CQ Congressional Transcripts, p. 36 (May, 7, 2013). 
 157.  In reality, the commander’s authority to review the findings and sentence is not 
merely a safeguard as a first level of appellate review. It is also a requirement to “complete” the 
court-martial so that the sentence can take legal effect. Military appellate courts can only review 
cases with “approved” sentences. UCMJ art. 66; 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2012). 
 158.  Id. 
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have been in passing on the case, if he had been one of the members 
of the court-martial itself.159 
Under Article 60 of the UCMJ, Congress preserved the com-
mander’s authority to set aside a finding of guilty or to change it to a 
lesser offense.160 The commander can exercise this authority only after 
obtaining and considering the written legal recommendation of his 
Staff Judge Advocate.161 In fact, the commander must not have a pre-
disposition to approve the findings or the sentence.162 The accused is 
entitled “as a matter of right . . . to an individualized, legally appropri-
ate, and careful review of his sentence by the convening authority.”163 
The exercise of this command authority is not limited to correcting 
legal error, but can be exercised for another important reason: when-
ever the commander, after reviewing the record of trial, is not himself 
convinced that the government met its burden of proof. This type of 
review is an important safeguard to the panel’s unsupported factual de-
terminations and is called, appropriately, the factual sufficiency review. 
Congress is now considering legislation to strip away this authority 
from commanders.164 Supporters of this proposal argue that, with the 
 
 159.  Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557 (1887). 
 160.  UCMJ art. 60(c)(1) & (3) (“The authority under this section to modify the findings 
and sentence of a court-martial is a matter of command prerogative involving the sole discretion 
of the convening authority.”). 
 161.  UCMJ art. 60(d). 
 162.  See United States v. Fernandez, 24 M.J. 77 (C.M.A. 1987) (when the convening au-
thority is performing his post-trial duties, his role is similar to that of a judicial officer). 
 163.  Id. at 78. 
 164.  S. 538, 113th Cong. (2013) (introduced by Senator McCaskill). Section 1(b)(2) states: 
If a convening authority or other person acts on the findings of a court-martial, the 
convening authority or other person may not— 
(A) dismiss any charge or specification by setting aside a finding of guilty thereto; or 
(B) change a finding of guilty to a charge or specification to a finding of guilty to an 
offense that is a lesser included offense of the offense stated in the charge or 
specification. 
Id. at §1(b)(2). See also Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, S. 967, 113th Cong. §6(b)(2) 
(2013) (introduced by Senator Gillibrand) (proposing the exact same text amendment as S. 538); 
A bill introduced to the house by Congresswoman Speier and seven others would amend the 
UCMJ as follows: 
As soon as practicable after the receipt of the findings and sentence of a court-martial 
by the convening authority, the convening authority shall approve of the sentence in 
whole. Except as provided in section 858b(b) of this title (article 58b(b)), the convening 
authority shall have no authority whatsoever to modify the findings or sentence of the 
court-martial. 
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commander removed from the process, a military accused would con-
tinue to have access to “a robust system of appeal rights.”165 But they 
are mistaken. The rights of appeal are not as robust as one might hope. 
In fact, experience shows that the commander is best suited to perform 
the type of review needed to make up for the panel’s flaws. 
Each military service has its own court of criminal appeals, which 
is authorized to review cases on appeal under Article 66 of the UCMJ. 
Unlike civilian appellate courts, these courts are empowered to review 
cases for both legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.166 The first 
type of review is the same review offered by all federal and state courts 
of appeal—the appellate court looks for legal error. An appellate court 
reviews each case to ensure the evidence presented at trial, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would permit a 
factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was 
committed.167 The appellate court will set aside a conviction based on 
legal sufficiency if there is a lack of evidence on an element of the of-
fense. The legal sufficiency review will not discover error in the jury’s 
factual determinations, because it is presumed that the jury—by its 
size, mode of selection, and unanimity—makes accurate determina-
tions. This type of review is designed to respect the jury’s verdict. 
A second type of review is therefore needed, one that does not exist 
elsewhere in the American justice system: the factual sufficiency re-
view. This review is similar to the one performed by the convening 
authority. Exercising this unique power, military appellate judges are 
supposed to affirm the convictions if, and only if, “after weighing the 
evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not having 
personally observed the witnesses, [the military appellate judges] are 
themselves convinced of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”168 This review is supposed to be performed even in the absence 
 
Military Judicial Reform Act of 2013, H.R. 1079 § 2(a). 
 165.  Julian E. Barnes, Pentagon Pushes Military-Justice Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2013, 
at A5. 
 166.  UCMJ art. 66(c) (“Court[s] of Criminal Appeals may . . . affirm only such findings of 
guilty and the sentence . . . as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the 
entire record, should be approved. In considering the record, it may weigh the evidence, judge 
the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the 
trial court saw and heard the witnesses.”). 
 167.  United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 1987). 
 168.  Id. at 325. One key problem is that only the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. 
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of legal error.169 So it may be asked why the factual sufficiency review 
performed by a court of criminal appeals cannot replace the com-
mander’s review. 
The answer is as simple as it is alarming. The factual sufficiency 
review is more illusory than it is real when it is performed by appellate 
courts. It may not happen at all. The rights of appeal under the UCMJ 
depend foremost on the sentence received and not on the legal error 
committed at trial. Military convictions can be appealed only if the 
sentence includes a sentence to death, a punitive discharge, or a sen-
tence to confinement of one year or more.170 If the approved sentence 
does not include one of these elements, there is no right of appeal.171 
Thus, for example, it is theoretically possible for an accused to be con-
victed of a sex assault and to have to register for life as a sex offender 
without any review being done on the case, because the approved sen-
tence was too low to qualify for appellate review.172 
More importantly, military appellate judges have struggled to per-
form the factual sufficiency review, despite their legal training and ex-
perience. No one really knows how to perform it. Law schools do not 
teach it. The Judge Advocate General’s School does not contain any 
 
The witnesses’ demeanors cannot be captured in the verbatim transcript of the trial. This aspect 
of the case is thus inherently unreviewable. Courts of criminal appeals must make allowances for 
“not having personally observed the witnesses.” This phrase appears in nearly every published 
decision. See, e.g., United States v. Ferres, __ M.J. ___ (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2013) (emphasis 
added). This is another way of saying military appellate judges generally avoid second-guessing 
the panel’s determinations as to the credibility of witnesses and controverted questions of fact. 
The whole point of the factual sufficiency review is that witnesses can be disbelieved. 
 169.  The factual sufficiency review has been called an “awesome, plenary, de novo power.” 
United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 338 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting United States v. Cole, 31 
M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1990)). 
 170.  UCMJ Art. 66(b). 
 171.  But compare what Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the Supreme Court a half-
century ago: 
Many deep and abiding constitutional problems are encountered primarily at a level 
of “low visibility” in the criminal process—in the context of prosecutions for “minor” 
offenses which carry only short sentences. We do not believe that the Constitution 
contemplates that people deprived of constitutional rights at this level should be left 
utterly remediless and defenseless against repetitions of unconstitutional conduct. 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52–53 (1968)(addressing warrantless searches under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 172.  When cases otherwise do not qualify for appellate review, a summarized record of 
trial is reviewed by a judge advocate for legal sufficiency under UCMJ art. 64(a). No meaningful 
review can be performed on a summarized record. 
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instruction on the matter. The Military Judges’ Course does not in-
clude it in its curriculum. The concept of a factual sufficiency review 
is so foreign to American jurisprudence that some members of Con-
gress justifiably consider the idea to be repugnant.173 
The military appellate courts’ performance of this type of review 
is not encouraging. Military appellate judges have committed no fewer 
than seven types of errors in performing this otherwise straightforward 
review. They have sometimes been unclear as to whether they did the 
review,174 they have applied the wrong legal standard,175 they have af-
firmed a lesser offense on a theory not presented at trial,176 they have 
reconsidered their own acquittals,177 they have affirmed a sentence in 
spite of insufficient evidence,178 they have affirmed a conviction with-
out knowing what the accused had been convicted of,179 and they have 
purported to clarify a panel’s ambiguous verdict using their own pow-
ers of speculation.180 These errors are all the more striking because no 
 
 173.  Senator Claire McCaskill made this point when she criticized a six-page letter from a 
commander explaining his reasons for overturning a sex assault conviction: “This letter is filled 
with selective reasoning and assumptions from someone with no legal training, and it’s appalling 
that the reasoning spelled out in the letter served as the basis to overturn a jury verdict in this 
case.” Julian E. Barnes, General Defends Dismissal of Sex-Assault Conviction, WALL ST. J., April 11, 
2013at A4. 
 174.  United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987) (remanding the case because it 
was not clear factual sufficiency review was done). 
 175.  United States v. Sill, 56 M.J. 239 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (remanding the case for new factual 
sufficiency review because it appeared the Air Force court had applied a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard instead of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard). 
 176.  United States v. Riley, 50 M.J. 410 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (Riley I) (holding that the lower 
court violated due process when it approved a finding of guilty based on a theory not presented 
to the court-martial panel). 
 177.  United States v. Riley, 55 M.J. 185 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (Riley II) (holding that the lower 
court misunderstood scope of remand when it was asked to clarify its ambiguous findings). 
 178.  United States v. Riley, 58 M.J. 305 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (Riley III) (holding that the lower 
court’s factual finding of guilty on offense was not legally supported by the evidence). 
 179.  United States v. Walters, 58 M.J. 391, 397 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (“The Court of Criminal 
Appeals . . . could not conduct a factual sufficiency review of Appellant’s conviction because the 
findings of guilty and not guilty do not disclose the conduct upon which each of them was based.”) 
(holding that the lower court improperly affirmed ambiguous finding of guilty with respect to 
the occasion of illegal drug use). 
 180.  United States v. Seider, 60 M.J. 36 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (holding that the lower court 
improperly affirmed ambiguous finding of guilt after speculating about the occasion of illegal 
drug use); see also United States v. Augspurger, 61 M.J. 189 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (reversing court of 
criminal appeals for affirming a conviction after conducting factual sufficiency review on an am-
biguous verdict). 
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legal training is required to perform the factual sufficiency review. Af-
ter all, the panel members who made the factual determinations in 
reaching the verdict also do not have legal training. Instead, panel 
members, like jurors, are supposed to supply the community’s com-
monsense judgment and values in making factual determinations. 
The courts of criminal appeals are no better structured to make 
factual determinations than the court-martial panels whose verdicts 
they are reviewing. Like court-martial panels, the panels of military 
appellate judges are small (usually three persons), they are not ran-
domly selected from a cross-section of the community, and, equally 
important, they do not have to be unanimous. In one case, a military 
appellate judge was not persuaded by the evidence in the record of trial 
with respect to 14 convictions. The convictions were still affirmed be-
cause no other military appellate judge agreed with him.181 In another 
case, the military appellate judges reportedly could not agree on the 
theory of guilt of a lesser offense on which they wished to affirm the 
conviction.182 The American public must wonder when military appel-
late judges, with all their legal training and experience, cannot agree 
among themselves that the convictions they are reviewing have been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The reality is that courts of criminal appeals have not effectively 
conducted these factual sufficiency reviews, and no one can or should 
blame them. The very notion of a factual sufficiency review is foreign 
to the American legal tradition. If there were any substance to the fac-
tual sufficiency review, it would have been adopted as a practice in fed-
eral and state courts of appeals.183 
 
 181.  See, e.g., United States v. Lubasky, 2006 WL 6625281 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (dis-
senting military appellate judge would have found thirteen more convictions to be factually in-
sufficient, but they were all affirmed). 
 182.  United States v. Riley, 52 M.J. 825, 829 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (“There is no 
requirement that two-thirds of the members of the court-martial agree on a particular theory of 
criminal liability. . . . We believe this rule applies to the judges on the courts of criminal appeals 
when performing their fact-finding duties.”), overruled by United States v. Riley, 55 M.J. 185 
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (Riley II) (finding that the lower court misunderstood scope of remand when it 
was asked to clarify its ambiguous findings). 
 183.  Appellate courts in only two states perform factual sufficiency reviews: Texas and New 
York. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.25 (West 2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15 
(McKinney 1994). Factual sufficiency reviews have posed problems for these two states as well. 
See, e.g., W. Wendall Hall & Mark Emery, The Texas Hold Out: Trends in the Review of Civil and 
Criminal Jury Verdicts, 49 S. TEX. L. REV 539, 588 (2008) (arguing Texas should abolish the 
WILLIAMS.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:03 PM 
471]  Safeguarding the Commander's Authority 
509 
The accused’s best hope for relief on this basis resides with the 
commander who convened the case and must review it. The U.S. 
Court of Military Appeals instinctively understood this point when it 
stated, “It is at the level of the convening authority that an accused has 
his best opportunity for relief because of the former’s broad powers 
which are not enjoyed by Courts of [Criminal Appeals] or even by this 
Court.”184 In exercising the power of review, the commander behaves 
more like ordinary jurors, whom the Supreme Court described as 
“plain people” who “manfully [stand] up in defense of liberty against 
the importunities of judges and despite prevailing hysteria and preju-
dices.”185 It takes great courage and commonsense for someone to per-
form this type of review. Commanders have both.186 
The commander was chosen for the position based on his proven 
record and demonstrated judgment. He brings a unique perspective 
and competence to the process. Like the accused, the commander also 
has a great stake in the case. He feels an acute sense of responsibility 
for it. The commander referred it to trial, and the verdict directly im-
pacts his command. The commander’s sense of responsibility is thus 
greater and more pronounced than what can be felt by any military 
appellate judge or court of criminal appeals, which has no ties to the 
command. The commander’s authority to review the findings serves 
as an important check and balance to an otherwise flawed system. The 
commander should therefore be allowed to continue his role in review-
ing cases. 
PART V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS TO CONSIDER 
If Congress is genuinely troubled by the decisions of convening 
authorities, it should consider returning the court-martial back to what 
 
factual-sufficiency reviews and do only legal-sufficiency reviews); Elizabeth A. Ryan, The 13th 
Juror: Re-Evaluating the Need for a Factual Sufficiency Review in Criminal Cases, 37 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 1291 (2005) (same); see also People v. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d 672, 673–75 (N.Y. 1987) (hold-
ing that Appellate Division erred in failing to conduct the statutorily required factual sufficiency 
review when defendant claimed evidence was insufficient). 
 184.  United States v. Boatner, 43 C.M.R. 216, 219 (1971) (case returned to convening au-
thority for new post-trial review because the staff judge advocate’s advice was deficient). 
 185.  United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18–19 (1955). 
 186.  For an example of a commander’s courageous and principled decision to disapprove 
the findings of a court-martial panel, see the Memorandum for Record by Lieutenant General 
Susan J. Helms (Feb. 20, 2012), infra app. 
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it was at the time when our Nation was founded. The court-martial 
then was solely a tool of command available to address disciplinary in-
fractions. General crimes were tried in federal and state court, where 
the common-law right to trial by jury is preserved for military mem-
bers and civilians alike. The commander has no authority to overturn 
civilian convictions, and society can be confident in the jury’s verdict. 
In the alternative, Congress can strengthen court-martial panels 
by having them acquire the features of the common-law jury. The logic 
behind the panel’s current features is that courts-martial may need to 
be tried during a military exigency or under austere conditions, and 
the panel should be able to reach a decision quickly, without the con-
currence of every panel member. Although the United States has par-
ticipated in numerous and ongoing combat operations since 2001, the 
logic for the panel’s features now seems antiquated and is no longer 
defensible. If the panel is increased to twelve members and randomly 
selected from a cross-section of the military community without re-
gard to rank or position, and the panel is required to follow the una-
nimity rule, the panel’s verdicts would be entitled to the same respect 
as that of a jury. As the Supreme Court stated, “There are dangers 
lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill 
of Rights and Article III of our Constitution.”187 Congress has the 
power to eliminate these dangers, and should consider doing so if com-
manders are removed from the court-martial process. 
If it were not for command oversight of the court-martial process, 
it would be an intolerable principle that the men and women of the 
U.S. Armed Forces are still denied genuine due process in this modern 
age. For its part, the American Bar Association endorses unanimity as 
the optimal decision rule for both criminal and civil jury trials.188 The 
ABA also recommends that, in criminal cases, juries should consist of 
at least twelve persons if a penalty of confinement for more than six 
months may be imposed, and juries should consist of at least six per-
sons if the maximum period of confinement that may be imposed upon 
conviction is six months or less.189 Except for two states, all other states 
 
 187.  Toth, 350 U.S. at 22. 
 188.  AM. BAR ASSOC., PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 6 (2005). 
 189.  Id. at 5. 
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require unanimous verdicts. This near-uniform judgment of the Na-
tion should provide Congress a useful guide to help it determine how 
court-martial panels should decide cases. 
If Congress is not ready to adopt these two recommendations, then 
perhaps it should not rush to judgment. It can, however, take some 
incremental steps. The first is for Congress to amend the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice to require unanimity by the panel for convic-
tions. In the alternative, Congress could require that the panel disclose 
its vote for each offense, much like the Oregon practice. This way, 
Congress will know how panels behave and can make informed deci-
sions about court-martial jurisdiction and the panel’s features. Con-
gress can also require that commanders consider the input of victims 
before taking action190 and that they justify, in writing, their actions to 
disapprove a finding or to reduce a sentence. This way, there will be 
greater transparency into how commanders decide to exercise their 
prerogative in reviewing these cases. 
But even if Congress decides to make the court-martial a full-
fledged court of law, the commander should still not be removed from 
the process. Otherwise the court-martial will cease to be a disciplinary 
tool. While the ends of discipline and justice may not be incompatible, 
they will become so if the commander is removed from the process. 
The court-martial must and should remain a tool of command. 
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
As Congress considers revisions to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, it should tread carefully. It should not upset the delicate bal-
ance between discipline and justice. If it is not careful, Congress will 
enfeeble commanders by taking away the very tool that makes them 
effective. When commanders cannot enforce discipline, their author-
ity and effectiveness is severely undermined. They must have authority 
to oversee trials of serious offenses, or there will be no reason for a 
separate military justice system. 
 
 190.  While the commander may consider matters outside the record of trial to disapprove 
the findings or sentence, he “may not consider matters that are derogatory or unfavorable to [the] 
accused . . . from sources outside the record without first affording [the accused] an opportunity 
for rebuttal.” United States v. Wilson, 26 C.M.R. 3 (C.M.A. 1958). 
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Martial law developed apart from the American system of justice 
for sound reasons. The Founding Fathers adopted martial law to help 
the United States rise on the world stage, as martial law had done for 
the Roman and the British Empires. When the Founding Fathers 
adopted it, they firmly believed that “an army cannot be kept together 
if its discipline is left to the ordinary common law.”191 They could not 
have imagined that Congress might one day consider removing com-
manders entirely from the court-martial process. Before Congress 
makes any drastic decisions, it should remember that the court-martial 
is a tool of discipline and that the panel is not the same as a jury. Left 
unchecked by command authority, the panel is a clear threat to liberty. 
A celebrated French writer reminded Blackstone that Rome, 
Sparta, and Carthage had all lost their liberties, and England in time 
must also perish. Blackstone replied that these great civilizations, “at 
the time when their liberties were lost, were strangers to the trial by 
jury.”192 We should ask ourselves if we, too, have become strangers to 
command authority and trial by jury. We may rediscover that our na-





 191.  Wiener, The Original Practice II, supra note 28, at 293 (quoting MAITLAND, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 279 (1908)). 
 192.  Story, supra note 15, at 407. 
